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COPYRIGHT AND CREATIVITY 
 
Professor Julie E. Cohen 1 
  
 
Thank you all. It is a pleasure to be here. What you are going to hear is not a single 
paper but rather a condensed version of a couple of book chapters.  
What I want to argue today is that copyright law, or at least American copyright law, 
which is my area of expertise, is premised on a defective model of creativity, and that 
that deficiency in copyright’s model of creativity is a direct consequence of the tools 
that lawyers and theorists have brought to the task of understanding the creative 
process. 
Legal scholarship is closely aligned with the tradition of liberal political economy, and 
therefore with the foundational principles on which that tradition rests. So, in 
particular, liberal theory regards the self as a disembodied abstract being; it treats 
knowledge as transcendent and existing on a plane separate from and superior to 
culture; and it treats the self and culture as fundamentally distinct entities. Those 
commitments exact a very high price when we start talking about copyright, because 
creativity operates at the interface between self and culture, and plays out in the 
concrete and materially determined contexts in which people live and interact. 
I would like to do three things in my time today. First, I want to critically examine 
copyright’s model of cultural development as it builds from those fundamental 
assumptions. Then we will take a look at some examples drawn from a variety of art 
forms and genres, and will use those examples to illustrate an alternative model of 
cultural development that more closely aligns with how creative people actually work 
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on a day-to-day basis. Finally, I will say a couple of things about how we might actually 
proceed to revise copyright law in accordance with that alternative model.  
COPYRIGHT’S MODEL OF CREATIVITY 
First let’s take a look at copyright’s implicit model of cultural development. You know, 
certainly, that copyright scholars don’t agree on whether current copyright laws strike 
the right balance between authors and the public. Some people argue that expanded 
rights are necessary to counteract the effects of technologies for mass reproduction 
and redistribution. Others disagree, and argue that to exploit the democratising 
potential of new digital media technologies, copyright protection should be balanced 
by a more robust set of exceptions. Earlier today, Professor Lessig characterised those 
debates as the copyright wars.  
Even so, copyright law is premised on a set of assumptions about the relationship 
between copyright and creativity that most people, on both sides of the debate, 
generally accept. Legal scholars on both sides of the copyright wars largely assume that 
copyright supplies incentives for authors to produce creative work, but that the 
creative process is essentially internal and unknowable. They assume that copyright 
can strike a satisfactory balance between the needs of authors and the needs of 
audiences as long as it includes well tailored exceptions for uses of great social 
importance. They assume that because copyright attaches only to creative expression, 
and not to underlying ideas, copyright can avoid frustrating future authors. A lot 
hinges on whether those assumptions are right.  
Let’s start with authors and the question of where creativity comes from. Legal 
scholars who advance rights based arguments for copyright have generally described 
creativity in terms of an individual liberty whose form remains largely unspecified. 
Sometimes this argument relies on self reporting by artists; when asked about why 
they create, artists tend to describe a process that is intrinsically unknowable. When 
legal scholars consider those self reports, however, they also add something. They 
characterise creative motivation as both intrinsically unknowable and essentially 
internal: a gift of self, or a ‘black box’ inside the mind of the author. The belief in 
creativity’s essentially internal aspect does not match the experience that artists 
describe at all. Artists may not be able to tell us why they create but they can tell us a 
great deal about the where, what and how of particular creative processes: what they 
were looking at, what they were reading, what they were listening to, who they were 
talking to, and so on. Social scientists who study the creative process have found that 
these things matter a lot. 
Economically minded scholars have focused on the marketable by-products of 
creativity. For scholars of the ‘copyright maximalist’ persuasion, creative motivation 
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matters only to the extent that we presume it is enhanced by the possibility of an 
economic reward. The details of why somebody would create this rather than that are 
irrelevant; market signals will take care of the details. Critics of the maximalist model 
challenge the argument that copyright always supplies an incentive to produce more 
creative material. They argue that sometimes creative motivation has no market 
origins. Even so, they generally agree with the maximalist view that the specifics of 
creative motivation are irrelevant. As James Boyle puts it, “It is irrelevant that people 
create, only that they do it”. If creativity is not purely internal, if it’s a function of what 
authors were looking at, and reading, and listening to, then the details matter.  
What’s missing from both rights based and economic accounts of copyright is careful 
consideration of the complicated interrelationship between authors and their 
surrounding cultural environments, within which works of artistic expression are 
created and used. Copyright law is an important factor in that environment, but it is 
only one factor, and we should want to know more about the other factors in play.  
Next, let’s consider the ways in which copyright defines and enforces rights in 
expression. In general, the drafters of copyright law have attempted to define rights 
that will extend to most commercialization of works of authorship. To shield certain 
uses, they have defined exceptions and limitations, and in most cases they have tried to 
define them narrowly. Of particular interest to many copyright scholars, there are 
almost no exceptions or limitations that cover what Jessica Litman has called “lawful 
personal use” of copyrighted works. Exceptions and limitations instead tend to be 
directed at public uses of high social value.  
Copyright scholars have different positions on where lines between rights and 
limitations should be drawn. Generally speaking, though, they tend to agree that 
markets for copyrighted use are more or less value neutral with respect to copyright’s 
ultimate goal of progress. Put differently, they tend to think relying principally on the 
market to order uses of copyrighted works allows the forward march of progress to 
proceed without interference, and without attempting to decide which kinds of 
progress are best. We can argue about whether or not the market needs to be corrected 
in particular cases, or whether we need a new exception or limitation, but otherwise 
we should leave well enough alone.  
One may object, first, that that account of progress makes some rather large 
assumptions about the transcendent nature of knowledge, and the linear forward 
marching character of progress. Those assumptions don’t square with a large and 
growing body of work in the social sciences that suggest that knowledge and cultural 
context are much more interrelated. That objection is extremely important, but I don’t 
want to talk about it today.  
More concretely, one might object that before we decide just how far rights in creative 
works ought to extend, we ought to have some idea about how the other side of the 
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progress equation works. Once a creative work is prepared and released, how do 
audiences interact with it, how do they receive it, what do they do with it? We say that 
copyright is supposed to promote the dissemination of knowledge and learning, but 
before we assume that the process is working well, we ought to have some 
understanding of what users of copyrighted works do with those works, and how and 
why they do it.  
Copyright lawyers have answers to those questions, but the answers turn out to 
depend on some extraordinarily one-dimensional models of user activities and 
interests. Sometimes people talk about a particular kind of user, who I will call the 
economic user, who enters the market for copyrighted content with predetermined 
tastes in search of the best deal or sometimes in search of a free deal. Copyright rules 
targeting commercial exploitation and rules about secondary liability for technology 
providers are designed for that user. They presume that, in general, copyrighted works 
must be paid for to be enjoyed in any of the ways that the user might want to enjoy 
them. In the context of those rules, the reasons for wanting to copy or reuse created 
material are typically deemed unimportant.  
At other times, some scholars talk about a different user who I call the romantic user. 
This person is quite an amazing being whose life is an endless cycle of sophisticated 
debate about current events, high quality blog posts, discerning quests for the most 
freedom-enhancing new media technologies, and home production of high quality 
movies, music, remix culture and open source software. This user’s reasons for 
copying or reusing content are so important that they are typically the reason for 
creating the exceptions and limitations that I mentioned. In general, though, copyright 
scholars don’t spend a lot of time thinking about the processes by which one would 
become a romantic user, or by which romantic users come into being.  
Now the interesting thing about these models is that copyright scholars have very little 
idea how these users relate to one another, so little that it sometimes sounds like they 
are talking about members of different species. But of course they aren’t different 
species or even different people. The economic user and the romantic user are often 
the same person. We should want to know a lot more about how that person comes to 
encounter and use cultural products, and to understand his or her own experiences.  
Finally, let’s consider copyright’s end-product, the works within which copyright 
protection subsists. We all learn on the first or second day of the copyright course that 
rights subsist only in the words “creative expression”, which is fundamentally 
separable from its underlying ideas. When disentangling the two gets complicated, we 
tell our students they can approach that problem by using levels of abstraction to 
separate the ideas from the expressions. The ideas, along with similar entities like 
processing and functional principles, exist in the public domain, where they are 
building blocks that anyone may use to construct new creative edifices.  
138 
The problem with this theory is that it is just plain wrong. It is created out of whole 
cloth, based on nothing more than legal theory’s assumptions about the relationship 
between culture and true knowledge. Remember again that legal political theory 
presumes that knowledge and ideas are abstract and transcendent, separate and 
distinct from the particulars of the expression that embodies them and the culture that 
surrounds them. We regard culture as an imperfect bridge to knowledge. We are 
confident that the repeated iteration of ideas through different modes of expression 
will lead us to progress, and that granting copyrights in the expression won’t frustrate 
that process. 
This model of cultural transmission is unique to intellectual property law. Nobody else 
thinks about cultural transmission this way. Scholars who study the arts and literature 
have catalogued an extensive list of imitative activities, including illusion, pastiche and 
so on, that are central to the ongoing process of culture production. All of those 
activities require the reuse of expression and proceed on the presumption that idea 
and expression are fundamentally indistinguishable. For artists positioning themselves 
relative to the previous generations, and relative to the surrounding culture, ideas and 
expression cannot be separated.  
The part of the story about end-products that deals with the public domain is also very 
odd, and is so regardless of one’s position in the copyright wars. The term “public 
domain” has pronounced geographic connotations, but we tend to worry about what 
is in the public domain, rather than where it is. The public domain comes to be seen as 
a mythical Heisenbergian place that is always accessible everywhere, whether or not 
that is actually true. There is a vital and enormously important advocacy movement 
for the public domain that has grown up over the last decade, and sometimes the 
rhetoric of that movement actually makes this particular problem worse. Its advocates 
use terms like “enclosure” to describe what is wrong with copyright today, and 
“commons” to describe what copyright ought to create, and those are geographic 
terms as well. The discourse of the public domain, which proceeds without 
acknowledging the geographic assumptions, can operate to minimise the questions of 
where public domain resources are actually located in real space, relative to the people 
who need to access them.  
To understand the cultural work that copyright does, and the role that it plays in our 
emerging information society, we need to do better than this. We need to confront and 
study the interdependencies between self and culture, including the ways that people 
become authors, the ways that users receive copyrighted works and the way that 
people use copyrighted works in the real world. And we shouldn’t begin that process 
presuming that copyright’s artificial model of the way that culture proceeds is the right 
model.  
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A DIFFERENT MODEL OF CULTURAL CREATION  
Now for the fun part.2 Before articulating a different model of cultural production it is 
useful to look at some real world examples. We are all familiar with the seemingly 
endless parade of contemporary examples of cultural borrowing. So here are two 
contemporary examples.  
The first is a progression of four slides, beginning with some things that served as 
inputs but were themselves copyrighted: an obscure Japanese art film, The Hidden 
Fortress, and a very popular American comic book series, The Adventures of Buck 
Rogers in the 25th Century, pieces which were combined in an inspired pastiche by the 
folks who brought us Star Wars – Episode IV: A New Hope. The film Star Wars – 
Episode IV: A New Hope ultimately became an empire of its own, and in turn inspired 
acts of borrowing and reworking. For example, you can visit www.blamesociety.net to 
view the adventures of Chad Vader, Lord Vader’s little brother, who came into being 
when somebody asked what if someone with Lord Vader’s distinctive physical and 
personality attributes ran a grocery store in New Jersey. Or, if your tastes run more to 
being the characters that you have imagined for so long, you can have a Star Wars 
themed wedding or party instead.  
Here’s a different example – the lawsuit between the Associated Press and an artist 
named Shepard Fairey. Fairey created the poster Hope, using as a template a photograph 
taken of Barack Obama by a freelancer for the Associated Press. Why did he do it? Well 
that was an image of Barack Obama that he could get. It could have been anybody else’s 
copyright photograph, but it happened to be that one. Since Fairey is not personally 
acquainted with Barack Obama, and wasn’t able to get close enough to him to get his 
own photograph, he had to use somebody’s. This image, as transfigured in the portrait, 
helped to fuel a grass-roots popular movement that gained momentum on the internet, 
but it has been dignified after the fact as high art. Shepard Fairey’s painted portrait of 
Barack Obama, reproducing the image from the poster, has now been hung in the 
National Portrait Gallery in Washington, DC. It has also been recycled back into popular 
culture. If you go to the website www.obamiconme.pastemagazine.com, you can create 
your own Fairey-style portrait. People have done some amazing things, including some 
that reference the other cultural example I talked about a moment ago, such as this 
portrait of Obi Wan Kenobi.  
We could go on in this vein for some time, and we could see, ad nauseam, examples of 
cultural works circulating, recirculating, being remixed and recycled in ways that 
involve the internet, but I don’t want to do that because the point I want to make is 
that the model of creative practice that these two sets of slides illustrate is much older 
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than the internet. It turns out that this basic pattern of the movement of culture, of the 
recycling of images back and forth between mass culture, establishment culture, and 
popular grass roots culture has existed for a very long time.  
Let’s look at some other examples. In 1920, photographer Louis Hine, working in the 
modernist medium of documentary photography, created an image of a nameless 
worker in a big factory, who became an iconic figure of modernist art. That figure was 
then recycled into a big budget work of mass culture, Charlie Chaplin’s movie Modern 
Times, which involves a nameless worker in a big factory, but in a distinctly non-
heroic way. The movie is a comedy of errors. Charlie Chaplin’s buffoonish character in 
the factory where everything goes amiss was then recycled into high art by American 
painter Larry Rivers, who took mass culture as his subject matter and created portraits 
of icons of mass culture within the settings in which they gained their prominence. 
And it’s not just the visual arts that work this way. Consider now a musical example. 
In 1899 Gustav Mahler took a nursery rhyme (Frere Jacques, or Bruder Martin in the 
German version) and turned it into the Third Movement of his Symphony No 1.  
What can copyright lawyers do with the examples on these slides? Well, we can start 
by acknowledging that the questions what do users do, and what do authors do, are 
really the same question. Everyone is a user of cultural works first and an author 
second, so we can start by replacing the artificial cardboard figures of the user and the 
author with a single figure, who I will call the situated user because that user is situated 
within his or her own culture.  
We can then lay out a model of creativity organised around the situated user that has 
five essential parts: 
 First – situated users engage with artistic and cultural works for multiple 
intertwined purposes, including consumption, communication, self-development, 
creative play. These activities shade into one another, and are impossible to 
disentangle, or understand, out of context. The ways in which situated users 
interact with creative works are so diverse as to defy easy characterisation. They 
use creative works to inform themselves and to fuel their own creative input and 
output, but also to imitate others, to perform cultural identities, and to build and 
sustain relationships. Some of these activities map to the economic user. They are 
just straightforwardly consumptive. Some activities map to the romantic user. 
They are bold exemplars of dissent. Many activities are mundane, and lie 
somewhere in between in that grey area that we haven’t looked at hard enough.  
 Second – the state of being a situated user entails cultural constraint. The everyday 
practice of users is constrained by the various social and cultural networks within 
which users find themselves. When those users become authors, their own 
creative output is subject to the cultural path dependencies that those networks 
create. Consider the following simple question: What should a painting of the 
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female face look like? [Images shown from a YouTube video titled “Women in 
Western Art”.] We are not going to watch the whole thing, but you get the point. 
This woman looks a particular way. Quite surprisingly, in every one of these 
paintings this woman does not look like the women in this room, or in this city, or 
in this country, or in this world. The images are much more uniform than they 
would be if creativity were simply an internal proposition rather than constrained 
by cultural demands. At the same time, though, the boundaries of the networks 
are fluid, so boundary crossings are frequent. Forms of expression can migrate 
from one network to another with astonishing speed. Consider first what happens 
when you cross traditional Malian music with the American blues. A result is the 
music of Ali Farka Toure. [Music played.] Then when you cross the music of Ali 
Farka Toure with that of Led Zeppelin, Jimi Hendrix, and other assorted 
American rock and roll influences, you get this: the rock music of Tinariwen. 
[Music played.] Boundary crossings between cultures happen because, of course, 
people within cultural networks are opportunistic. They see things that float in 
front of them and they grab them and mix them with what they already know. A 
different kind of cultural boundary crossing is illustrated by the obamicon.3 The 
boundaries between mass culture, high art, and popular grass roots culture are 
very fluid. Things circulate, and recirculate, across those boundaries. 
 Third – boundary crossings can create conflict because the artistic influences 
come into contact with the values of particular social groups. On your left is 
Tjangala’s Emu Dreaming, which became the subject of litigation when it was put 
onto a carpet without the original Aboriginal people’s permission, and in direct 
conflict with their religious practices. On your right is a nativity family that you 
could have bought from Target last year at Christmas time, showing you that 
Christianity does not take the same view of the commercialisation of its religious 
symbols. We have culture then as a kind of contest, in which different groups 
struggle about the forms of artistic expression, about what is permissible, and 
about what these expressions mean.  
Sometimes the struggle is resolved one way, and sometimes another. I don’t mean 
to be making an argument about how the carpet case should have been resolved. 
What I mean to be making is a more general point about what keeps the system of 
culture in motion. Situated users appropriate and use works of creative expression 
in many ways which are intertwined with and channelled by the forms of 
expression within those networks. 
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 Fourth, the creative practice of situated users is embodied and materially situated. 
Situated users use their bodies to communicate works to one another – for 
example, singing and dancing to popular songs, or repeating lines from favourite 
TV shows. Sometimes it is really obnoxious but this is what we do – dancing the 
Macarena, for instance. [Video played.] I looked for the video of Peter Costello 
being taught to do the Macarena on a talk show that you have here, but sadly it 
seems to have been taken down. [Video of teacher showing the Macarena moves.] 
This is very mundane stuff, not sexy remix culture, but this is a common 
denominator. This is what people do, and it is important, because this is how we 
process our culture. Sometimes the mundane way we process our culture is 
remixed into something more elevated. [Clip from the film Muriel’s Wedding with 
characters lip-synching to Abba music.] Here this music is more than just a 
shallow pop song. It’s embedded in a movie about ultimate female empowerment, 
although you would have to watch the whole movie to get there. Sometimes 
embodied cultural practice is strange. This is a prison in the Philippines where 
they do dance therapy. [YouTube video of prison inmates dancing to Michael 
Jackson’s “Thriller”.] That’s fun to watch on video and it’s probably on the list of 
100 things you have seen on the internet unless you are a loser, or old or dead or 
whatever. The loftier point is that culture is an embodied conversation. The body 
is how people process their culture. This has implications not just for whether we 
can copy, but for the scope of the rights of public performance and 
communication to the public, whichever name they are called in the country you 
are in. That is why I prefer the term “cultural landscape” to “public domain“. 
Creative practice by situated users involves working through what is ready to 
hand in the cultural landscape that is there around them. This means that often 
works of mass culture will be the raw material for a new creative effort. To 
experience, assimilate, appreciate, and have a conversation about works of mass 
culture requires behaviours like this. When we create our own works, we begin 
with real bodies and spaces.  
 Finally –The creative practice of situated users relies on interplay between what is 
ready to hand and familiar in the cultural environment, on one hand, and 
serendipity or play on the other. People are opportunistic. They latch onto 
whatever they encounter. Always the familiar, but also the unpredicted and the 
unpredictable. For authors, creative practice is most fruitful when it includes these 
encounters with the unpredicted – and when it includes the freedom to exploit the 
serendipitous encounter without asking permission to do so first. This interaction 
between the familiar and the unexpected in the cultural landscape is exactly what 
we refer to when we talk about why art and intellectual culture are important on a 
personal level. We talk about art opening time and space for reflection. We talk 
about how the serendipitous encounter and its unexpected creative fruit 
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contribute to a dynamic culture, a culture that moves and avoids becoming 
calcified and rigid. These things are what we mean when we talk about why art is 
important. They ought to be what copyright seeks to promote.  
A LOGICALLY DISCONTINUOUS COPYRIGHT LAW 
I want to close with some brief thoughts about how copyright ought to respond to the 
reality of creative practice. To begin, we need to acknowledge that copyright plays a 
relatively small role in stimulating many of the processes that I have just described and 
shown to you. That doesn’t mean that copyright is unimportant. Copyright is 
extraordinarily important. It simply serves a different set of goals than the ones that we 
have become used to thinking that it serves.  
Copyright serves roles that are primarily economic. It creates predictability in the 
organisation of cultural production, and this is important, particularly in capital 
intensive industries like film and television. It generates revenues, exports, jobs – all 
things that are good – and it enables the production of mass culture, which is so 
extraordinarily important. It’s quite fashionable among free culture advocates to pooh 
pooh mass culture and talk about how bland and banal it is. I couldn’t disagree more. 
Mass culture is a crucial ingredient in the process of circulation I described. We need 
the mass culture to enable everything else. At the same time, we need to acknowledge 
that the single-minded pursuit of economic predictability and fixity, and of the 
copyright primacy of mass culture, frustrates creative practice by situated users. We 
would be worse off if people couldn’t do things like those we have just seen and heard.  
A good copyright system needs to hold both of these goods, economic fixity and 
cultural mobility, in the balance. That means that the rules that establish rights in 
creative works need to ensure sufficient breathing room for creative practice as it 
actually occurs. The rules should ensure degrees of freedom, if you will, within which 
the serendipitous encounter can take place, and within which serendipitous 
appropriation and reuse can occur.  
This requires narrower rights, with gaps and discontinuities between them. A logically 
discontinuous copyright law – a regime characterised by incomplete rights, by logical 
gaps that permit imitation and reworking, is exactly what is required.  
This is easy to say but very hard to do for three reasons. We resist setting limits on 
rights, and this resistance is deeply embedded in the form of legal reasoning our 
culture prizes most highly. I will illustrate it with an anecdote. The other day I asked 
students in my upper level seminar to describe their law school exam taking strategy. I 
asked them to imagine that they were taking an exam in some non-copyright-related 
subject like torts or constitutional law, and they had been given a long complicated 
fact-pattern and asked whether the plaintiff would succeed with any number of 
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theories of relief. I asked, do you think you would get a better grade by arguing that the 
plaintiff could succeed or fail? They unanimously agreed that they thought they would 
get better grades by attempting to show how the plaintiff could succeed even if it 
required an expansion of the grounds recognised by the law as the basis for recovery.  
Now, to some extent, this response reflects successful internalisation of the common 
law method of flexible incrementalism that is so beloved of our Anglo-American legal 
system. To some extent, it reflects successful internalisation of the principle that you 
should seek to please your clients, by getting rights extended if necessary. But students 
also understood arguments for extension as demonstrating more skill at lawyering, 
and more true understanding of the subject matter. You really understand torts, or 
you really understand constitutional rights, or whatever, when you can explain why a 
particular rule really extends to cover situations to which it has never before been 
applied. That’s what lawyers do, and skill at doing it is a key indicator of professional 
and intellectual excellence. Within that analytical frame, it makes sense that arbitrary 
barriers to copyright expansion, for example, should fall away before the relentless 
logic of good lawyering.  
The second reason that we resist setting limits on copyright stems from a set of 
convictions that are essentially technocratic. We believe that if we try hard enough, we 
can define in an extraordinarily precise fashion the rules of a good copyright system. If 
we really use our language to the full extent of our ability, we can define rules that 
separate the economic exploiters from everyday users – the people who make the good 
technology from the people who make the bad technology, and so on. When those 
technocratic instincts are coupled with our expansionist inclinations, the result is a 
seemingly iron-clad case for broad open-ended rights with narrow precisely defined 
exceptions.  
The third reason, the icing on the cake, is what I call a naïve restitutionary impulse, the 
idea that commercial gain to anyone other than the right holder constitutes an injury 
that demands compensation, so that the right holder can be made whole. If we need to 
expand copyrights to do this, then we ought to do it. Yet there is a deep irony here. 
When we commit ourselves to a legal methodology that treats limited, discontinuous 
rights as logically disreputable, no matter what the context, we detach means from 
ends. When you have competing, equally important goods on both sides of the 
equation, as we do in copyright, it becomes impossible to balance the competing and 
equally important interests that the copyright system must serve.  
In order to have a good copyright law that is logically discontinuous in the way I just 
described, we need to invert some of those most fundamental assumptions. I think 
that this quite a tall order. 
Thank you very much. 
 
